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Abstract: Remittance networks built through transnational migration have transformed local 
economies as well as social lives in many parts of the world. In this article, I examine the 
relationship between transnational migration and local business practices for ethnic Fulɓe people 
from the Fouta Djallon highlands of Guinea. Although some Fouta Djallon residents have 
withstood poverty with the help of remittances from migrant relatives, many migrants fail to earn 
money abroad. But despite slim chances of success, migration remains a popular undertaking, 
especially for young men. Meanwhile, non-migrants engage in small business projects that yield 
little or no income. Analyzing informants’ critiques of  “uselessness,” I argue that both near-
impossible migration quests and seemingly irrational business practices are linked by a common 
desire to achieve social personhood under adverse structural conditions. Apparent striving for 
success mitigates failure to send or earn money, even while reproducing ideals of mobility and 
entrepreneurship in responsible personhood. 
[remittances, transnational migration, personhood, Guinea, Fulɓe/Fulani, West Africa] 
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One afternoon in February 2010, I sat on the street of a residential neighborhood in 
Dakar, Senegal and drank tea with several young ethnic Fulɓe men who had come to the city 
from the Fouta Djallon highlands of the Republic of Guinea. Two of the men worked as security 
guards at the nearby houses. The rest were currently unemployed, but hoping to get work as 
guards—or as anything—should the opportunity arise. Since I had recently come from Guinea, 
they asked me the question Guinean Fulɓe living in Dakar often asked me: which place did I 
prefer, Guinea or Senegal? I got a laugh with my usual answer—that I liked Guinea because I 
liked to eat taro, a food that many people from the Fouta Djallon both love and love to joke 
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about, associating it with the most rustic village life. Then, I turned the question back to them: 
which place did they prefer? One of the young men, Alimou,1 began to rhapsodize about 
Guinea’s superiority to Senegal: “In Guinea, you can eat without paying. You can do what you 
want. Even if you don’t work, you can just walk around and there is always plenty to eat.” 
“Well, then, why are you here?” I asked Alimou. The other young men laughed and 
echoed my question. Alimou tried a few times to change the subject, but the others repeatedly 
called him back to it, saying, “If Guinea is so good, why are you here?” 
“Seriously,” Alimou said, “if I could go to America or Switzerland and get a lot of 
money, what I’d really want would be to go right back to Guinea, build a road to the village, 
build a nice house, and eat taro and bananas. Of course being there is better than being here! But 
to buy clothes and shoes, to have money to build a house, you have to make money. And there is 
no way to make money if you stay in Guinea.”  
Another of the young men, Mamadou Korka, interrupted him. “People leave Guinea and 
try for twenty years to make money and they don’t succeed!” he cried. “Why do you think that 
you will succeed?” 
On the surface, there was no mystery as to why most of the Guinean Fulɓe men and 
women I met in Senegal had left their homes in the Fouta Djallon, just as there was no mystery 
why most Fouta Djallon households I knew could claim members working outside of Guinea: 
people wanted and needed to make money. Young men left to seek (ɗaɓɓugol, in the Pular 
language spoken in the Fouta Djallon) not just their own fortunes, but also those of the people 
they were expected to help support: their parents and older family members, their current and 
future wives and children, and, more broadly, the villages, towns, and regions they called home. 
Women left the Fouta Djallon to join husbands abroad, and they too sought to make money, 
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either in partnership with their husbands or on their own. Though rich in natural and mineral 
resources, Guinea is one of the poorest countries in the world. But within Guinea, the Fulɓe-
dominated Fouta Djallon has a reputation for being more prosperous than the country’s other 
regions. Remittances from family members near and far have provided many Fouta Djallon 
residents with new houses, cars or motorbikes, and pilgrimages to Mecca, while associations of 
expatriates contribute money to build or renovate hometown mosques, schools, health centers, 
and other forms of infrastructure.2 Young men like Alimou left home aspiring to make money. 
Lamarana, another Guinean Fulɓe man I interviewed in Senegal, echoed Alimou’s words: 
 
When we’ve left Guinea and we’ve gone abroad, what we want is to get money. Because if 
you’ve got money, then you’ve got everything. Because you hear people say that money is the 
key to the world…if you’d had it back home, you would not have left. 
 
Both Alimou’s and Lamarana’s comments reflect the widespread sentiment in the Fouta 
Djallon that migrants were primarily motivated by the desire to earn money and send or bring it 
home. And yet, as Mamadou Korka pointed out, migrants often did not succeed in making 
money, even after years of trying. In Dakar, one of the most popular destinations for Fouta 
Djallon migrants, some Guinean Fulɓe residents ran prosperous businesses and sent their 
children to the university; however, others worked at menial, low-wage jobs, barely earning 
enough to eat one meal a day, let alone send money home to their families. And though many 
people did send home remittances in the form of money and gifts, they often managed to do so 
only for particular occasions—like weddings, births, illness, and funerals—and sometimes only 
by borrowing from friends in less straitened circumstances. When making money was so difficult 
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and sometimes impossible, why did young men like Alimou and Lamarana insist that only the 
promise of making money kept them away from the Fouta Djallon, where they otherwise wanted 
to be? Would they truly have preferred to stay home, had economic necessity not driven them 
away? Likewise, how did their parents, siblings, wives, and friends back in Guinea manage their 
daily lives without much income, either in remittances or from their own earnings? Could they 
really, as Alimou declared, “eat without paying”? If money is the “key to the world,” why would 
possessing it motivate someone not to travel the world, but rather to stay home, as Lamarana 
suggested? 
In this article, I illustrate that the answers to these questions lie in understanding how 
particular notions of personhood infuse practices of migration, work, and money-earning for 
people in a transnational remittance economy. I argue that Fouta Djallon migrants embark on 
their journeys abroad against seemingly impossible odds not only to earn and send home money 
but also in quest of social personhood—a desire they share with their family members who stay 
behind and endeavor not to appear “useless” by engaging in small, often unprofitable, business 
projects. I show that when the experiences of migrants are examined in juxtaposition with the 
economic activities undertaken by people in migrant-sending communities, the importance of 
social personhood for all individuals becomes clearly evident. Beyond aspirations of making 
money, going abroad allows migrants to present themselves as striving to be responsible 
members of the communities they leave behind—even if the reality of their experiences leaves 
their ideals of personal success unfulfilled. Likewise, individuals who stay in their hometowns 
and engage in small-scale entrepreneurial activities that earn almost no money at all are 
performing a similar notion of responsible personhood. People desire wealth, but they rarely 
 6 
manage to attain it, whether at home or abroad. Instead, by either striving invisibly at a distance, 
or else working industriously at home, they seek the respect accorded a responsible person.  
My argument draws on anthropological theories of personhood in African contexts and 
beyond, bringing these into conversation with the growing literatures on transnational migration 
and youth transitions to adulthood in conditions of economic uncertainty. Following Marcel 
Mauss’s classic essay tracing the notion of the person or self through time and space, 
anthropologists have engaged in various ways with the concept of “the person,” referring 
alternately to an interior awareness of self, and to the enactment of social roles and 
responsibilities—for Mauss, moi and la personne morale, respectively (Fortes 1973, La Fontaine 
1985, Jackson and Karp 1990, Strathern and Stewart 1998, McIntosh 2009; cf. Mauss 
1979[1938]). Paul Riesman, who wrote extensively about personhood among Fulɓe groups in 
Burkina Faso, effectively brought these aspects together, asserting that “being a person and 
understanding what a person is are the same sort of process; that being a person is essentially a 
process of making meaning” and therefore necessarily involves connectedness to other 
individuals, with whom meaning is communicated and shared (Riesman 1992:10). Following 
Riesman, I focus on personhood as a social concept that reflects individual desires as well as 
shared expectations. I use the term “personhood” not as the gloss of a comparable Pular language 
word, but rather to describe more broadly the constellation of consciousness, roles, and 
responsibilities that motivate Guinean Fulɓe migrants and non-migrants alike. Thus, I emphasize 
the processual aspects of personhood, examining what individuals hope to become and how they 
relate to others over the course of their lives (cf. Carsten 1995). I understand this process as an 
agentive one, whereby individuals actively “seek” (ɗaɓɓugol) personhood, and their fortunes, at 
once. Guinean Fulɓe migrants and entrepreneurs struggle to achieve and maintain ideals of 
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respectable personhood in a context where global structural inequalities and increased policing of 
international borders make acquiring the material trappings of a successful life difficult, if not 
impossible.    
 Notions of personhood are especially salient in contexts of transnational migration, where 
conceptions of what makes a proper person reflect differences in perspective within migrant 
groups, as well as between them and host country nationals (Green 2011). Anthropological 
studies of migration have shown that migrants who are able to send remittances gain status and 
recognition in their hometowns, as well as in associations of fellow expatriates in their countries 
of residence (Trager 2001, Riccio 2011). And though aspiring migrants are often motivated by 
economic need, they may also desire to participate more fully in a globalized world where they 
see mobility as synonymous with modernity (Mains 2007, Lindquist 2009, Chu 2010). This 
article contributes to these literatures on personhood and migration, first, by showing how 
migrants strive to achieve recognition as responsible adult persons even when they are unable to 
send much, or any, money. And second, I show how particular ideals of successful personhood 
connect migrants who leave home to seek their fortunes with their family members who, in 
staying home, occupy their time with business projects that stand little chance of making money. 
 This article also contributes to anthropological work on youth transitions to adulthood in 
contexts of economic uncertainty. A number of studies, particularly those focusing on the 
experiences young men, have illustrated how boredom and waiting for opportunities that never 
materialize induce frustration and a sense of helplessness at being trapped in apparent limbo 
between youth and social adulthood. And yet, widespread unemployment and dispossession may 
also be productive of new political engagements, social connections, and cultural practices for 
those who are left with an overabundance of time and little else (Mains 2007, Jeffrey 2010, 
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Masquelier 2013). In contexts where social adulthood is achieved largely through marriage and 
children, earning enough money to support a family and build a house is critical to becoming 
recognized as an adult person (Hansen 2005, Coulter 2009). In many cases, confronted with a 
dearth of formal sector employment, yet wanting to survive and also partake in cosmopolitan 
consumption, youth turn to independent entrepreneurship to participate in the global neoliberal 
economy (Scheld 2007, Martin-Iverson 2012). Here, I demonstrate how ideals of proper adult 
personhood motivate the entrepreneurial efforts of both migrants and non-migrants to earn 
money, or to appear to be trying to earn money.  
 Migration and entrepreneurship are the two preferred paths to earning money, and 
thereby achieving adult personhood, in Guinea’s Fouta Djallon region, where I have worked and 
done research since 2002. My conversation with Alimou, Mamadou Korka, and their peers was 
one of many discussions of migration and money-earning that I witnessed during ethnographic 
research in the Fouta Djallon and among Guineans from the Fouta Djallon living in Dakar, 
Senegal, from July 2009–December 2010. Making up between 30 and 40 percent of Guinea’s 
total population of 10.5 million, most contemporary Fouta Djallon residents consider themselves 
ethnic Fulɓe and trace their ancestry back hundreds of years to nomadic pastoralists who settled 
in groups across West Africa.3 This deep history of mobility, reshaped and accelerated during an 
era of socialist state repression when between one quarter and one third of all Guineans left the 
country (1958–1984), has contributed to many Fouta Djallon residents’ conceptions of 
themselves as people who move—which in turn figure in idealized notions of Fulɓe 
personhood.4 Invoking distant historical narratives of nomadism as well as narratives of socialist 
era persecution and exile, some of my informants explained contemporary migration from the 
Fouta Djallon with the claim, “Moving is in our blood.” Although I have found no reliable 
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statistics comparing rates of migration between Fulɓe and members of other Guinean ethnic 
groups, Fulɓe do maintain a reputation within Guinea for being especially numerous among 
Guinean migrants abroad. Fulɓe are also widely believed to dominate Guinea’s commercial 
sector, partly as a result of their transnational business connections. The contours of my research 
reflected these conceptions of Fulɓe mobility. I based my fieldwork at different times in a Fouta 
Djallon town that I call “Daande Caanguel,” a smaller village that I call “Hamdallaye,” and the 
heterogeneous West African metropolis of Dakar, which is both a migrant destination in its own 
right and a transit hub for Guineans en route to Europe, North America, the Gulf States, China, 
or further abroad in Africa.5 My research brought me into contact with the same people in 
different places, and with different groups of people connected to each other through kinship or 
hometown ties, despite geographic distance.  
Mamadou Korka’s challenge to Alimou, “Why do you think that you will succeed?” was 
a question that Alimou could not readily answer. Like many others who had come to Dakar to 
seek their fortunes, he had no marketable skills or training, and no seed money to start a 
business. He sometimes found odd jobs, mostly manual labor—work that he would have been 
ashamed to do at home, in full view of everyone he knew. He did not always have enough to eat. 
He shared a small room and a bed with three cousins around his own age, all in similar 
situations. To understand why Alimou considered that striving to make money abroad was 
worthwhile despite the many challenges involved, it is necessary to consider the broader social 
meanings, expectations, and motivations that shaped his individual search for success. 
In what follows, I first examine the concept of remittances. I argue that focusing on 
remittances, in isolation from other forms of monetary or material gifts and exchange, is, first, 
virtually impossible in many contexts; and second, such a focus overlooks the significance of 
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shared ambitions, desires, and notions of personal responsibility that link communities of people 
between small villages and larger cities, in home countries and abroad. I then examine the 
process of desiring and working toward a départ—the financial start in life that migrants told me 
they wanted—and how this aspiration fits in with other major life goals that mark the path 
toward responsible personhood. Subsequently, I present examples of the barely profitable 
economic activities pursued by those remaining in Guinea. Examining small business efforts as 
not strictly economic activities but also as social engagements, I analyze informants’ critiques of 
“uselessness” to explain why individuals so often commit themselves to entrepreneurial projects 
that may seem economically irrational. Desiring to “leave a trace” in the world by building a 
house and parenting children, Fouta Djallon residents and migrants alike seek to achieve both 
wealth and responsible personhood. 
 
Remittances everywhere and nowhere 
Throughout much of the Fouta Djallon, connections to the world beyond Guinea seem 
plainly evident. Fouta Djallon residents I knew during fieldwork made frequent references to 
migration experiences in the course of daily conversation. Whether referring to their own past 
travels, expressing their desires to leave the country in the future, or showing photos of their 
absent family members, nearly everyone around me talked regularly of their relations with “the 
exterior.” The landscape was dotted with houses built by individuals who were working or had 
worked abroad. Mosques, chain-link fences, and schools were often built and maintained by 
groups of expatriates organized to support their hometowns. Despite national poverty and 
perpetual political uncertainty, many people in the Fouta Djallon appeared to be managing fairly 
well with the help of money earned abroad.  
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And yet, beneath this appearance of success abroad lies a more complex reality of 
striving and failure, reciprocity and responsibility. Money sent or brought by returning migrants 
plays a widely acknowledged role in hometown constructions, but remittances themselves do not 
easily fit into a single category distinct from other kinds of monetary movement and exchange 
that take place everyday among Fouta Djallon residents and expatriates. Remittances were 
important for many—though not all—of my informants, but they were often impossible to see in 
isolation from either other sources of money or long-term social relationships of obligation and 
reciprocity.  
Remittances have attracted considerable attention in policy and development circles for 
their growing role in the global economy, with recorded remittances often compared—
favorably—to dollar amounts of aid and foreign direct investment channeled from developed to 
developing countries (World Bank 2011). In these comparisons, remittances appear as a source 
of economic growth and political stability for developing countries and their citizens, achieved in 
accordance with neoliberal ideals of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, World Bank-sponsored 
publications acknowledge actual global remittance figures to be virtually unknowable, with 
much money sent through informal, unofficial, unrecorded channels (e.g. Mohapatra and Ratha 
2011:222, Ratha et al. 2011:5, 51, World Bank 2011:x, xvii-xviii). This is especially the case in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where “only about half of the countries…collect remittance data with any 
regularity, and some major receivers of remittances report no data at all” (Ratha et al. 2011:5). 
The disjuncture between remittances as conducive to national development, on the one hand, and 
as shadowy unknowns, on the other, reveals how remittances may be politically or economically 
constructed in different ways. Rather than accepting the category of remittances at face value, I 
 12 
build on anthropological analyses that interrogate the meanings and conceptual boundaries of 
remittances and other forms of monetary obligation and responsibility in social contexts.  
Hernandez and Coutin (2006) have argued that “expert” discourse serves to produce and 
define remittances as a measurable category. Situated at a “strange intersection of neoliberal 
economic strategies and grass-roots empowerment efforts,” remittance discourse relies on 
particular accounting—or “discounting”—practices that represent remittances as cost-free 
national income, regardless of migrants’ individual sacrifices or suffering (Hernandez and Coutin 
2006:186). Money earned and sent by individuals, often at great personal cost to both migrants 
and their non-migrant families and with no assistance from any government, becomes the focal 
point of nation-states’ efforts to harness transnational populations for political support or 
investment in national development (Baker-Cristales 2008, Mohan 2008). And yet, since 
“development” may have different meanings in different contexts, a community’s use of 
remittances may not coincide with national or international ideals (Grigolini 2005, Trager 2001). 
Furthermore, as Anna Lindley (2010) has demonstrated in the case of Somalia, remittances may 
serve different political ends at different times, contributing to the intensification of conflict and, 
later, to defusing it.  
Whatever the potential significance of migrants’ earnings for national economies or 
political regimes, remittances are not necessarily a meaningful concept in every context, even 
where migration is frequent. As a researcher in Guinea and Senegal, I initially struggled to frame 
my questions about remittances in ways that would elicit the kinds of responses I thought I 
wanted. The French term transferts d’argent (“money transfers”) was useful in a limited way, 
referring to sums received through agencies like Western Union or Moneygram; even when 
speaking Pular, people often inserted the word transfert into the conversation to refer to this kind 
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of transaction. But transfert did not encompass other ways of sending and receiving money, as 
when people carried cash on return journeys. In Dakar, with money transfer fees ranging from 10 
percent with informal, Guinean-owned services to between 20 and 100 percent at Western Union 
and Moneygram, people often preferred to entrust cash to close friends and relatives traveling to 
the Fouta Djallon.6 After some discussion, a research assistant suggested that I use the term 
kaalisi safaari—money from or of a journey—to refer to all the money that a person might 
receive from sources outside Guinea. When I tried this in an interview, asking a man whether he 
had ever received kaalisi safaari, he immediately pulled a 50 Euro note out of his pocket to 
demonstrate that he had; but he declined to tell the story of how he had obtained the 50 Euros, 
merely stating that Euros and US dollars were everywhere. Indeed, Euros, US dollars, and West 
African CFA francs circulated widely, and could be exchanged for Guinea francs even in small-
town shops. As the weeks and months passed, I developed other, more circuitous ways of asking 
informants when and how they received money from family members living outside of Guinea. 
But I also realized that remittances in the Fouta Djallon were often indistinguishable from other 
enactments of social obligations and reciprocity, motivated by individual desire as well as social 
expectation.  
Anthropological studies of migration have consistently shown that remittances reflect the 
broader social lives of people who send and receive them. Beyond supplying people with often 
badly needed money, remittances also create social ties and solidarity between groups of people 
around the world (Cohen 2011, Monsutti 2005). Anthropologists have taken remittances as the 
starting point for understanding questions of family, marriage, and gender in transnational 
relationships (Åkesson 2011, Lubkemann 2005, McKay 2007, Pauli 2008). In some instances, 
even seemingly insignificant sums of money and small gifts can go a long way toward 
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maintaining reciprocal kinship and social ties that ultimately provide migrants with the option to 
move back home when they become too old to work (Cliggett 2003). As money that moves 
between people, remittances lend themselves to analysis of social ties created and maintained 
when people feel themselves obligated to give, receive, and reciprocate (cf. Mauss 1990). And 
yet, though a focus on remittances may be illuminating in some contexts, in others—such as the 
Fouta Djallon—remittances are often practically indistinguishable from the many other 
transactions situated on the cusp of individual striving and collective social concern (cf. Bloch 
and Parry 1989). Migrants’ ambitions to go abroad and seek their fortunes, even while 
acknowledging the severe difficulties of earning enough money to save or send home, are 
intimately intertwined with individual desires for social personhood. This relationship becomes 
clear when individual migrants’ stories of earning, or failing to earn, money abroad are examined 
in conjunction with the barely profitable business practices of non-migrants at home, as the 
following sections demonstrate. 
 
Leaving a trace: the sociology of a départ  
 In both the Fouta Djallon and Dakar, I frequently heard of people sending home regular 
sums to support their parents and other older relatives, or to support the education of children, 
younger siblings, and cousins. But the young Fulɓe men I knew in Dakar aspired not only to 
support their families, but also to earn what they called a départ—effectively, a sum of money 
large enough to give them a start both in business and in life. In addition to the possibility of 
earning money, getting one’s départ entailed going on an “adventure” (aventure) in the world, an 
adventure that many people spoke of as having an educational value. Within this popular 
narrative, migration to Dakar or the world beyond becomes a young man’s quest for adult 
 15 
personhood. The trope of a young man going off to seek his fortune in order to return and win a 
bride loomed large in the Fouta Djallon. However, the cost a young man faced in getting married 
was significant, including the bride-price (formerly given in cattle, now usually cash), gifts of 
money for the bride’s friends, sisters, and aunts, new clothes for the bride and other members of 
the family, and enormous amounts of food for the wedding celebrations. After marriage, either 
the new wife would number among the people to whom the migrant groom sent money, or 
else—if her new husband had a room with a bed, which was far more expensive to obtain in 
Dakar than in Guinea—she would travel abroad to join her husband, who was not required to 
come home for the wedding ceremony. Ideally, marriage would be followed by the births of 
children and the construction of a house in the groom’s hometown.  
 These goals of getting married, subsequently having children, and building houses were 
not unique to migrants: Fulɓe in both Guinea and Senegal spoke of these as required 
qualifications for anyone to be considered a responsible adult. Building houses and having 
children were two of the ultimate life achievements that people referred to as “leaving a trace” 
(laisser une trace, or accugol batte in Pular). A life lived without leaving behind some sign that a 
person had been on this earth was essentially a failure. But “leaving a trace” could rarely be 
accomplished without money, the “key to the world” cited by Lamarana, above. And though 
some people managed to build successful businesses without ever going abroad, the prevailing 
notion among Fulɓe was that one could not properly get one’s départ if one stayed in Guinea. 
Money sent and carried home from abroad had the power and recognition of foreign hard 
currency, unlike the notoriously weak Guinea franc. As one interviewee put it,  
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Our money has no strength. It’s weak. The difference is, if you work abroad [leydi porto, literally 
“white people land”] for five years, what you earn there is like if you worked here for thirty 
years. 
 
One problem with this model was that the cost of living in Europe and North America, and even 
in places closer to home like Dakar, was far higher than in Guinea. A very basic room in Dakar 
cost at least 20,000 to 25,000 CFA francs per month in rent—about $40 to $50. In contrast, a 
similar room in Labe, the largest city in the Fouta Djallon region, might cost 20,000 to 25,000 
Guinea francs per month—from $3 to $5, according to the shifting exchange rates during my 
research period. Dakar rent prices were shocking to some migrants who, if they had ever paid for 
housing at all, had paid considerably less. The cost of rent, electricity, water, and food could 
easily consume whatever money migrants managed to earn in a month. 
 Examples of successful Guinean Fulɓe in Dakar certainly existed. A few prosperous 
entrepreneurs from the Fouta Djallon ran transnational business empires, constructed multi-story 
buildings in suburban neighborhoods, and gave their sons and daughters university educations. 
(Occasionally, while walking or riding public transport with me through Dakar’s neighborhoods, 
an informant would point to a large building and say, “A Pullo-Fouta owns that.”7) More 
generally, Guinean Fulɓe operated most neighborhood shops in Dakar’s residential areas, and 
they made up the overwhelming majority of the city’s fruit and vegetable vendors. Soon after 
arriving in Dakar, I discovered that I could speak Fouta Djallon Pular to shop-owners or fruit 
vendors, expect to be understood, and strike up new acquaintances. Guineans in Dakar often 
invoked a Fulɓe talent for entrepreneurship to differentiate themselves from Senegalese citizens 
who had migrated to the capital from the countryside. This was an ideal that women shared as 
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well as men. Salimata, a Guinean vegetable vendor in Dakar, distinguished herself in this way 
from the ethnic Serer Senegalese laundry women who sat on the street corner opposite her 
vegetable stand. Though the Serer women had come from rural areas of Senegal to work in 
Dakar, just as Salimata and other Guinean women had come to Dakar from the rural Fouta 
Djallon, Salimata considered the Serer to be fundamentally different from herself. The Serer 
women sat on the street corner all day, hoping that residents of the neighborhood would hire 
them to wash laundry by hand. Salimata sat and sold vegetables that she had bought at a distant 
suburban market early that morning. “Fulɓe don’t like to work for other people, they like to work 
for themselves,” Salimata told me. Often, this meant going into commerce. “If Fulɓe can find 
something to sell, they will sell it. Only if they can find nothing to sell will they start working 
like a Serer,” she concluded. Through observations like this, Salimata and other Guinean Fulɓe 
in Dakar articulated shared notions that independence and entrepreneurship were particular and 
ideal attributes of a proper Fulɓe person. 
But running a business required start-up capital, personal connections, or both—and 
many migrants left Guinea with neither resources nor supportive social networks as they tried to 
make their way in an unfamiliar place. Fulɓe unable to muster enough capital to start their own 
businesses, or whose businesses failed, tried to find whatever jobs they could, even if these did 
not conform to ideals of Fulɓe work. Even Salimata, an established neighborhood vendor, urged 
me to hire her to clean my apartment and do my laundry when we first met. During my months 
in Dakar, I heard of many instances of migrants who found no work at all, and could not even 
raise enough money to pay their return transport to the Fouta Djallon. These cases of failure were 
almost never discussed or acknowledged as such in migrants’ hometowns, as the following 
account illustrates. 
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 One of my informants, 25-year-old Alpha Amadou, left his hometown of Hamdallaye in 
the Fouta Djallon and came to Dakar during my fieldwork. Soon after his arrival, a cousin helped 
him get work at a palm oil warehouse in one of Dakar’s markets. Every morning he would fill a 
plastic container with oil and carry it on his head through the marketplace and the surrounding 
neighborhoods, trying to sell one liter or half-liter at a time. There were several others doing 
exactly the same thing, so that the number of palm oil vendors seemed far greater than interested 
buyers. By working all day long, he earned enough to eat his midday meal. Rarely, he made 
enough to eat two meals. Alpha Amadou had arrived in Dakar with his life’s savings of about 
$1,000, which he then lost when the cousin to whom he had entrusted the money absconded to 
Angola. He had not planned to sell oil from a container on his head, a kind of work he and other 
Fulɓe considered demeaning. He hadn’t realized that the young men he knew in Hamdallaye, 
who had gone abroad and later returned talking about the superiority of life in Dakar, had been 
obliged to carry their employers’ merchandise on their heads, or do manual labor for small 
amounts of money. No one talked about this back home. In Dakar, Alpha Amadou saw men he 
used to know in Hamdallaye who now pretended not to recognize him; he could tell they were 
ashamed to be seen doing the kind of work they were doing. So he learned that when he passed a 
man he had once known who was now carrying a container of oil or someone else’s baggage on 
his head, he must look aside and pretend not to see. Though rarely declared as such, failure and 
shame were common experiences for Fulɓe migrants who found themselves unable to do work 
they considered respectable, let alone establish a business, and whose attempts to earn money 
enabled them to do little more than survive.8  
 Migrants like Alpha Amadou who did work they considered shameful were motivated 
against seemingly impossible odds by their desire to achieve enough of a fortune to bring them 
 19 
into adult personhood, toward marriage, children, a house, and “leaving a trace.” Some people 
told admiring rags-to-riches stories about notoriously wealthy Fulɓe businessmen who had come 
from poor families and made their départ through hard work.9 But the temporality of this scheme 
was critical. Many young men’s willingness to suffer through particularly difficult circumstances 
abroad was supported by the popular notion that these difficult circumstances were only 
temporary—that as soon as they had earned enough money to marry and start their own 
businesses and adult lives back in the Fouta Djallon, they would be able to leave behind the 
hardship they had endured to achieve their goals. One young man emphasized in an interview 
that he did not especially want to be in Dakar, and hoped to return to Guinea as soon as he had 
the means to start a small business there: 
 
I want to go home…But how I will go home, my wish—God knows what he’s doing, [but] my 
wish is that I will have for myself a little money [manankun]. So if I go home, it will be to go 
and get a place [pilaas, i.e. a restaurant or shop]. If today I got the money to get a place, even a 
small one, even a little café, I’d get it in Guinea.  
 
 The rapidity or slowness of money earning was a part of this idealized temporality. Most 
people recognized that earning money cleanly and honestly must be a gradual process. Many 
informants associated the swift accumulation of riches with illegal activities like drug dealing, 
prostitution, stealing, and sorcery. Selling alcohol, though legal according to state laws, was 
illegal according to Islam and regarded in virtually the same light as selling drugs. In some cases, 
the widespread truism that honest money could only be earned gradually served as a defense for 
Fulɓe working abroad who had not sent significant gifts or sums of money home to their parents. 
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According to one anecdote I heard, an elder man in Daande Caanguel reproached his son in 
England for not having provided him with the things that other elders in town had received from 
their children working abroad—new houses, cars, and pilgrimages to Mecca. The son in England 
replied that he could give his father all of those things very quickly—if he started to sell drugs. 
But otherwise, they would all have to wait, while he earned money slowly and honestly, 
according to ideals of Fulɓe propriety. The gradual timing of honest money-earning helped to 
explain and moderate the failures that many migrants experienced; failures could be interpreted 
not in absolute terms, but rather as temporary setbacks within the long and possibly indefinite 
process of striving for financial and personal success. 
 The adventures of young Fulɓe male migrants in Dakar and elsewhere in the world are in 
some ways heroes’ quests, following in a tradition of West African epic figures who leave home 
to embark on risky undertakings, ultimately for the collective benefit of their kin and home 
communities (Bird and Kendall 1980). Pular speakers describe migrants as going “to seek” or “to 
search” (ɗaɓɓugol). “He left to seek,” a Fulɓe parent might say of a son who had gone to Senegal 
or Italy or Angola. “His [and our] fortune” would be the implied object of the search, but so 
would “his [and our] future.” A hero son returned from adventure would see to his parents’ 
comfort, marry a local bride, have children, and build a house—effectively, transition to adult 
personhood. And yet, at best, the process of leaving these “traces” would likely take many years 
and multiple return trips. In many cases, as Mamadou Korka asserted in the exchange with which 
I opened this paper, “people leave Guinea and try for twenty years to make money and they don’t 
succeed.” Discussing the hardships experienced by migrants to the Indonesian island of Batam, 
Johan Lindquist points out that “what is initially imagined as a rite of passage does not 
necessarily lead to a resolution” (Lindquist 2009:12). This sentiment would have resonated with 
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many Guinean Fulɓe men in Dakar who after years of striving had yet to get their départ. 
Furthermore, though migrants from the Fouta Djallon traveled frequently to Dakar, post-
structural adjustment Dakar was less a site of economic opportunity than itself a city of 
emigration, a transit point from which large numbers of Senegalese, Guineans, and other West 
Africans sought to move onward to more distant corners of the world—even via clandestine and 
extremely dangerous fishing boat voyages to Europe (Melly 2011).  
 While some young men like Alpha Amadou were unpleasantly surprised at the working 
conditions they discovered in Dakar, others, like Mamadou Korka, spoke as though success for 
Guineans abroad were practically impossible. And yet, despite at least a partial awareness of the 
challenges involved, Fulɓe with few or no resources have continued to leave the Fouta Djallon to 
seek a départ elsewhere. One elderly woman in Hamdallaye explained the situation bluntly and 
succinctly:  
 
“What’s making people here leave and taking them abroad? The money there is strong. If they 
go there and make money, they’ll come back and exchange it. They’ll buy land, they’ll build 
villages, they’ll bring cars. This is the main advantage of going. Today, whoever doesn’t go 
abroad will be incapable, useless.” 
 
This fearful prospect of being generally regarded as “incapable” (kelɗaa) or “useless” (hittaa) 
motivated many Guinean Fulɓe, especially men, to seek their fortunes abroad. Migrants faced 
slim odds of economic success; they might rarely send remittances, and they might experience 
personal shame from the nature of the work they were obliged to do. But to live life at home 
without a means of earning any money, and consequently without any means of proving oneself 
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“capable” and of “leaving a trace,” meant almost certain failure at becoming a responsible 
person. And while failure abroad might be hidden from families and communities at home, 
failure at home happened in full view of the very people to whom one was unable to fulfill one’s 
obligations. Under these circumstances, people who were obliged to stay home often did work 
that earned little or no money, but that nevertheless demonstrated their responsible personhood to 
others.  
 
More than just sitting around, but less than earning a living: evading “uselessness” 
“In Guinea, you’ll see young people, maybe fifteen people, twenty people, even thirty people, 
sitting from seven o’clock in the morning to seven o’clock at night, or even until eight, or nine, 
or ten, or midnight. They’ll be making tea, playing checkers, telling jokes…” 
--Guinean Fulɓe man in Dakar, March 2010 
 
 Young people in the Fouta Djallon, and indeed throughout many areas of Sahelian West 
Africa, sometimes enjoy sitting and talking in a group while drinking tea brewed in three rounds 
from a common pot (cf. Masquelier 2013). This popular social activity, which can take the better 
part of an afternoon, was a subject of critique among many Fulɓe, as the informant quoted above 
implies. Whereas this man had embarked on a quest to seek his fortune and his future, those 
remaining in his hometown were—in his estimation—just sitting around, and not working. The 
frequent characterization of youth as “just sitting around” (jooɗagol tun) was consistent with a 
larger collective self-critique that Fouta Djallon residents frequently directed against themselves 
when comparing Guinea with other postcolonial states they considered more developed. Once, 
during my research in Hamdallaye, a schoolchild’s notebook cover printed with color 
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photographs of Dakar street scenes and the English words “Dakar New Look” became the 
subject of much admiration among a group of men who were themselves sitting and making tea. 
Commenting on the roads and buildings in the photos, the men all discussed how in Senegal, 
people worked—not like here, in Guinea. Deploying unflattering stereotypes, this rhetoric of 
“rueful self-recognition” helped bind Fouta Djallon residents together in a kind of “cultural 
intimacy,” while simultaneously blaming them for national problems (Herzfeld 2005). At the 
same time, some individuals who found themselves unable to either migrate and send home 
remittances, or earn a living through work in the Fouta Djallon nevertheless went to significant 
lengths to demonstrate that they were not “incapable” or “useless.” In order to show their 
families and communities that they were, or were becoming, responsible adult persons, both men 
and women occupied themselves with entrepreneurial ventures that counted as respectable work, 
even when their efforts yielded little or no profit. Like Weber’s Protestants, people in the Fouta 
Djallon recognized hard work and striving for economic success as signs of virtue (cf. Weber 
2003).10 But far from achieving wealth through capitalist accumulation, most individuals 
working in the Fouta Djallon managed, at best, to forestall allegations of social “uselessness.” 
 For the majority of people in Guinea, as one informant put it, “Fin de mois alaa”—
essentially, “there is no payday.” Guinean civil servants got paid at the end of the month, but 
these people were few in comparison with the population as a whole. Even government 
functionaries and teachers who in principle did receive monthly salaries rarely found their 
incomes either reliable or sufficient. Salary payments were often delayed, and during periods of 
national insecurity banks closed for long stretches, the money inside rendered inaccessible. 
Salary levels were paltry compared with most households’ expenses, especially in a context of 
rampant inflation and rising prices of basic necessities like food staples and gasoline. A woman I 
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knew in Hamdallaye had worked as a schoolteacher since 1970. In 2010, after forty years in the 
same job, her salary was less than one million FG (in late 2010, about $150) per month. With the 
price of a 50 kilogram sack of rice approaching 250,000 FG, and a large household of people 
who could finish 50 kilograms of rice in little more than a week, her salary alone was barely 
enough for basic survival. Meanwhile, teachers and other government functionaries without her 
seniority were obliged to make do with even lower salaries.11 And although Guineans who 
worked for international organizations and foreign embassies could count on being paid more 
regularly than those working in the public sector, their salaries were generally commensurate 
with what a comparable Guinean institution would have paid them—thus much less than that of 
their expatriate co-workers, and in Guinea francs rather than foreign hard currency. When the 
exchange rate plummeted, so did their salaries’ buying power.  
 People without salaried jobs, for whom there truly was no payday, managed to get by (se 
débrouiller, or débrouillugol in the Pular adaptation of the French verb) by patching together a 
combination of income-generating schemes. Remittances from relatives abroad might regularly 
or occasionally supplement money earned through local business projects, but people receiving 
remittances rarely allowed them to replace their entrepreneurial endeavors; instead, people spoke 
of money sent from migrant relatives as providing them with the means to invest and expand 
their business efforts. Beginning as teenagers—and sometimes even before—most people in the 
Fouta Djallon were in the process of figuring out how to make money in conditions that were 
unpromising at best. But though surviving, let alone prospering, could be difficult, most 
individuals were not willing to do just any kind of work; if possible, they directed their efforts 
toward entrepreneurship, in keeping with the notion—sometimes implicit, sometimes stated 
outright—that Fulɓe were especially skilled in this area. Few people had disposable income of 
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any kind, and profit margins were small. Nevertheless, business was the ideal, much preferred to 
farming, which some Guinean politicians argued would be more beneficial in developing the 
country. Some Fouta Djallon residents explained the supposed Fulɓe distaste for agriculture as 
rooted in the Fulɓe legacy of nomadic pastoralism, though few Fulɓe in Guinea today rely on 
their animals for their livelihood. Most Fouta Djallon women kept home gardens, multi-cropping 
cassava, maize, taro, sweet potatoes, peanuts, squash, and other vegetables for home 
consumption. But large-scale agriculture was associated with lower-status social groups rather 
than Fulɓe, who preferred commerce.12 A typical business plan involved opening a small shop to 
sell items that people bought on a daily basis, like soap, candles, batteries, tomato paste, and tea. 
But this kind of venture was only an option for those who had already gotten a départ, or whose 
family members, within Guinea or abroad, could provide start-up funds. Others had to think of 
more creative entrepreneurial approaches. 
 Some enterprises that required little start-up capital could be surprisingly profitable. In 
Daande Caanguel, I got my daily water supply from Abdourahmane, a man in his mid-forties. 
Working with about a dozen of his own plastic jerrycans and a cart, Abdourahmane spent his 
days ferrying water from the town pump to his regular customers. Abdourahmane would pour 
the water from two of his jerrycans into my own two personal jerrycans, empty from the 
previous day’s use. I paid him the going rate of 500 FG per jerrycan. If he managed to deliver a 
hundred jerrycans of water a day, Abdourahmane made 50,000 FG ($7-$8). This worked out to 
be 1,500,000 FG (about $230) a month—more than the salaries of many government 
functionaries. Abdourahmane’s work was distinguished from the manual labor performed by 
Guinean migrants in Dakar because Abdourahmane operated his own business rather than 
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working for someone else. Nevertheless, the hard physical labor of carrying water for others did 
not appeal to most young, male Fulɓe as a business plan. 
 Cases like Abdourahmane’s notwithstanding, most people did work that seemed hardly 
worth the effort, so small were the profits involved. A young married woman I knew in 
Hamdallaye made snacks—tiny meatballs, fishballs, and beignets—to sell at the village’s weekly 
market. With each item selling at 100 or 200 FG, she might bring in 35,000-37,000 FG ($5-$6) 
by the end of the day—barely more (and sometimes less) than she had spent on ingredients. One 
government functionary in Daande Caanguel supplemented his unreliable salary by selling 
mobile phone recharge cards. For every 92,000 FG (about $14) in recharge cards he sold, he got 
to keep 1,500 FG (less than $0.25). With lots of competitors selling the same cards, and with 
many customers buying cards in small, 1,000 FG and 2,000 FG increments, earning money this 
way was slow. In a good month, he might sell 4 million FG in recharge cards, earning about 
65,000 FG (about $10) for himself. In months when local mobile phone coverage was spotty or 
nonexistent for several days at a time—not an uncommon event—he earned much less. Daouda, 
a high school student in Hamdallaye, occupied himself during his 2010 summer vacation by 
selling gasoline by the liter out of repurposed gin bottles. On the one hand, he could be sure of 
selling all the gas he acquired; inexpensive Chinese-manufactured motorbikes were increasingly 
popular even in rural areas, and the closest official gas station was in Labe, some twenty 
kilometers away. Daouda had two twenty-liter plastic jerrycans, which he would take to Labe 
and fill with gasoline at the station pump for the official price of 6,500 FG (about $1) per liter. 
Back in Hamdallaye, Daouda would pour the gas from the jerrycans into individual liter bottles 
and display them by the side of the road, for sale at the local black market rate of 7,500 FG per 
liter. This was a profit of 20,000 FG (about $3) per jerrycan, 40,000 FG for both, but that profit 
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was immediately halved if Daouda traveled to Labe to buy the gas himself—his seat in a shared 
taxi would cost 10,000 FG each way. Daouda got around this by commissioning taxi drivers 
traveling between Hamdallaye and Labe to take his empty jerrycans to the gas station and fill 
them for him, for a fee of 2,500 FG per jerrycan. Daouda estimated that he sold between four and 
six jerrycans-worth of gasoline in a month, clearing a profit of between 70,000 FG-105,000 FG 
($10-$16) if he refrained from traveling to Labe at all himself. While this was not a bad summer 
income for a high school student who lived and ate with his family, Daouda would never have 
been able to support himself, let alone save for marriage or start building a house, relying on his 
gas money.  
 Small enterprises like these might appear irrational. People made only meager amounts of 
money, and sometimes even failed to break even, and yet persisted in this work. Why? Those 
who did otherwise—those who appeared to be sitting around and not working—could face 
widespread censure for failing to fulfill their responsibilities as adult persons. To “just sit” 
(jooɗagol tun) was no good, Fouta Djallon residents told me on numerous occasions. Many, even 
most people operated on a middle ground between failure and success, doing more than just 
sitting around, but less than earning a living. People who never made what they considered a 
départ, or whose moments of financial prosperity had come and gone, nevertheless worked 
according to ideals not only of what was profitable, but of what was socially acceptable and 
laudable. If they could be seen to be working industriously, they could be seen as responsible 
persons, rather than as “incapable” (kelɗaa) or “useless” (hittaa).  
 This was especially the case for women, who rarely risked criticism from their families or 
the public by sitting around a teapot and not working.13 Patrilocal marriage patterns in the Fouta 
Djallon meant that young married women often lived in households with their husbands’ parents, 
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brothers, and brothers’ wives, where they were responsible for work including cooking, cleaning, 
gardening, and taking care of their own and others’ children. In theory, a husband would give or 
send his wife regular sums of money to support the household, but this was contingent upon his 
earnings, which might be insufficient or sent infrequently. Consequently, women did not worry 
like men about getting a départ to afford marriage, but they incurred a number of expenses and 
obligations after marriage, often struggling to feed and clothe their children and send them to 
school, while also supporting aging parents. Activities like selling snacks at weekly market days 
might or might not enable women to meet some of these financial obligations, but they did allow 
women to demonstrate to their husbands’ families and to their larger communities that they were 
working, and not “just sitting” around.  
  For both women and men in the Fouta Djallon, small-scale business efforts like selling 
market snacks, phone recharge cards, or gasoline by the liter demonstrated a sense of 
responsibility and personhood but yielded little to no profit. Often, these efforts were “informal,” 
in that they were not registered with any government entity, followed no official regulations, and 
paid no taxes (cf. Hart 1973). Outside traditional regulatory structures, informal economic 
activities may involve creativity and ingenuity, with people constantly on the lookout for 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Nevertheless, in Guinea and in other contexts of structural poverty, 
people can only afford to pursue business opportunities on a small scale; and those working at 
informal economic activities often survive only just barely, postponing rather than preventing 
total financial meltdown (cf. Hart 1973:79-81).  
 If they earned little money, however, people who engaged in small-scale, informal 
commerce showed their families and communities that they were responsible persons who 
worked hard to manage difficult living conditions as best they could. Under the structural 
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constraints of poverty and underdevelopment, as well as the shared ideals that privileged 
entrepreneurship rather than manual labor or farming as acceptable work for Fulɓe, Fouta 
Djallon residents endeavored not to be socially “useless” but rather to demonstrate their 
capability. Those who went abroad to seek their fortunes, meanwhile, through their absence 
avoided exposing themselves to accusations that they were “just sitting around” and not working. 
Even if young Fulɓe in Senegal did sometimes sit and drink tea, like Alimou, Mamadou Korka 
and their peers in this article’s opening vignette, their sitting was invisible to their families and 
hometowns.  
 
Conclusion: In search of personhood abroad and at home 
 For people growing up in the Fouta Djallon, the notion of going abroad “to seek” 
represents one of the most attractive paths to personal success. Visible traces of other migrants’ 
achievements, especially in the form of houses and other constructions, shape the physical 
environment and provide ideal models of what work abroad makes possible. Money sent or 
brought home from abroad affirms the possibility of success through transnational migration. 
And yet, for many people, migration is an experience of disappointment. Dreams of making 
money to get a départ go unfulfilled, and instead of pursuing independent business ventures, 
migrants are often obligated to take up manual labor and other work they consider shameful. 
Sometimes, they have little to do but “just sit” and drink tea, inactivity for which they would 
have been criticized at home. However, despite this disappointment, many people in the Fouta 
Djallon consider the best option for enduring poverty and insecurity at home to be seeking their 
fortunes—and thus their adult lives—abroad, even after multiple failures and setbacks. 
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At some level, the difficulties that Guineans and others confront in transnational 
migration can be read as a consequence of growing global inequalities and obstructions 
preventing the movement of people to and from certain areas of the world. Even as Guineans and 
migrants from many other countries have continued to see mobility as a way toward money-
earning and personal success, national borders have become increasingly policed in the name of 
nationalism and security (Fassin 2011). Over the past decades, most citizens of African countries 
have benefited little from the flows of money, goods, and people supposed to be characteristic of 
neoliberalism, and restrictions have become increasingly tight on the movement of Africans into 
other world regions (Ferguson 2006). While many Guineans continue to express the desire to go 
to Europe or North America, the reality is that increasingly stringent visa policies have made 
Western countries largely inaccessible to most West Africans. Those who do not already have 
strong family connections, academic scholarships, or plausible asylum claims are unlikely to 
obtain even tourist visas to North America or Europe. Under these circumstances, young 
Guinean Fulɓe have told me, they are willing “to go anywhere.” For entrepreneurs looking to do 
business, China and Dubai have become major hubs (cf. Haugen 2012, Lyons et al. 2012). For 
many would-be migrants, so-called “South–South” migration, especially movement from one 
African country to another, seems most promising (Whitehouse 2012). In Angola, oil and 
diamond wealth have attracted much foreign investment and enriched a small percentage of the 
population, and Angola has consequently gained a reputation among Guineans as a place with 
dollars just waiting to be earned. And yet, for many Guineans, reaching African countries 
beyond the sub-region is nearly as difficult as getting to Europe or the U.S. I met men in Guinea 
who had braved the distance and expense of the journey to Angola only to be imprisoned and 
deported back to West Africa after their arrival. Migration to Senegal and other neighboring 
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countries remains an option for Guineans intent to go abroad, but with persistent poverty in the 
wake of structural adjustment, recent and in some cases ongoing violent conflict, and, most 
recently, an Ebola epidemic, opportunities in the sub-region are limited. With the latitude to 
pursue their own survival strategies inhibited by global exclusions and structural inequalities, 
Guineans have been both participants in and victims of the supposed free markets and global 
flows of neoliberalism (cf. Han 2012, Ong 2006, Elyachar 2005). 
Clearly, adverse structural conditions play a significant role both in motivating economic 
migrants to leave their homes in the first place, and in constraining their chances of success 
abroad. However, by examining instances of failed or disappointed migration together with the 
kinds of time-consuming yet unprofitable work undertaken by non-migrants at home, a more 
nuanced picture emerges in which the search for money is closely interconnected with the search 
for respectable adult personhood. Migration from one poor country to another might seem 
economically irrational, and unprofitable entrepreneurial ventures might seem badly planned, but 
when examined together, these patterns become understandable as individual strategies for 
demonstrating one’s capacity to become a responsible person. My Fulɓe interlocutors in Guinea 
and Senegal sought to become responsible persons and “leave a trace” in the world by marrying, 
building houses, and having children. Remittances are part of this ideal life trajectory, but they 
blend in with a host of other social expectations. Earning money abroad is important, and 
migrants consider themselves obligated to support their parents, siblings, and children financially 
by sending money home when they can. But adult women and men who never leave their 
hometowns express the same obligations to their kin, whether they are able to fulfill them by 
earning money or not. And when migrants do send money home, they are interested not only in 
supporting the daily lives or education of close relatives, but also in advancing their own 
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personal futures as responsible adults who build houses, parent children, and support families. 
Meanwhile, to prevent friends and neighbors from judging them useless and incapable, people 
living in their hometowns engage in small-scale entrepreneurial ventures that allow them to do 
little better than break even. Critical ethnographic studies have highlighted the importance of 
understanding migration not only in political and economic terms, but also as a social process 
that shapes selves, communities, and nations (e.g. Lindquist 2009, Chu 2010, Melly 2011). 
Examining instances of economically failed migration in juxtaposition with unprofitable business 
practices among non-migrants moves this discussion further beyond a focus on remittances as 
the intended object of migration and toward a more textured understanding of how apparent 
striving allows individuals to present themselves as responsible social persons, even in contexts 
where economic success seems unlikely.  
Both at home and abroad, people living on the edge of survival work to achieve a 
semblance of respectable personhood. This can be a long and contingent process, as people 
remain on the lookout for any opportunity that could give them a start in life. Within days or 
weeks of my conversation with Alimou, Mamadou Korka, and the other young men around the 
teapot, some of them may have found work in Dakar, others may have found a way further 
abroad beyond Senegal, and still others probably returned to Guinea. Alpha Amadou, the palm 
oil vendor, returned to Guinea after only a few months in Senegal. The following year he went to 
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, to try his luck again there. In 2012, still looking for a way forward, he 
moved to Conakry and, with $15,000 pooled from family members, traveled to Dubai to buy 
merchandise to sell back in Guinea. As long as he continued to seek his fortune according to the 
ideals he shared with others in his hometown, he could prevent—or at least postpone—not only 
economic failure but also a future of being considered an incapable, useless person.  
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1 I have changed the names of all individuals to protect their anonymity.  
2 Senegal and other countries in the sub-region are common migration destinations for people in 
the Fouta Djallon, as are France, Guinea’s former colonial power, and the United States. 
However, since I first began working in Guinea in 2002, I have heard people mention as migrant 
destinations—and met people who have lived in—virtually every country in Western Europe, 
Canada, Australia, Japan, North African countries including Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, most 
countries throughout West Africa, and some central and southern African countries, especially 
Angola. China and Dubai have become popular commercial travel destinations for traders who 
go to buy merchandise.  
3 For the sake of consistency, I use the term “Fulɓe” to refer to Pular language speakers in and 
from the Fouta Djallon region of Guinea. However, ethnicity in Guinea and the surrounding 
region is complex. Pular-speaking nomadic herders began moving into the Fouta Djallon 
possibly as early as the 13th century, coexisting with different groups of sedentary farmers. In the 
18th century, Muslim Fulɓe nobles and clerics engaged in a holy war and subsequently 
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established an Islamic theocracy, ruling over “captives” of mixed ethno-linguistic origins until 
the French conquest of 1896. Today, virtually all Fouta Djallon residents speak Pular as their 
first language, but historical status differences remain important. A number of classic and 
contemporary ethnographies have been written about related groups of people known variously 
throughout West and Central Africa as Fula, Fulani, Peul, Wodaaɓe, and Haalpulaar’en, 
speaking languages called Pular, Pulaar, and Fulfuulde (e.g. Stenning 1959, Dupire 1962, Regis 
2003). 
4 Though movement across national borders was heavily restricted during first president Sekou 
Touré’s 26-year rule, estimates suggest that about two million people had left the country by the 
time he died in office in 1984 (Kaba 1985:178). I have analyzed the links between 
historiographies of Fulɓe nomadic mobility, socialist era political exile, and contemporary 
economic migration elsewhere (Fioratta 2013). 
5 The population of “Daande Caanguel” was approximately 16,000 at the time of my research, 
and that of “Hamdallaye” around 1,500. The Guinean (understood to be mostly Fulɓe) 
population of Dakar probably numbered in the tens of thousands. Many of my informants 
claimed that between one and two million Guineans lived in Dakar, but the entire population of 
Dakar and its surrounding areas is around two million. 
6 According to World Bank studies, the cost of sending remittances to most world regions has 
decreased in recent years, but remains high for Sub-Saharan African countries. The cost of 
sending $200 averages 12 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa, but only 8 percent for other 
developing regions. The cost of sending remittances from one Sub-Saharan African country to 
another, “if permitted at all, tends to be even higher” than remittances sent from outside the 
region (Ratha et al. 2011:5-6). For migrants who can afford to send only smaller sums, the cost 
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of an entire transaction may be doubled by fees: during my 2009-2010 fieldwork, sending $20 
via Western Union or Moneygram from Dakar to Conakry cost over $20. 
7 “Pullo” is the singular of “Fulɓe,” while “Pullo-Fouta” and “Fulɓe-Fouta” are terms by which 
Pular speakers from the Fouta Djallon frequently refer to themselves. 
8 The willingness of Fulɓe migrants to do forms of labor abroad that they would have been 
ashamed to do at home is similar to the practices of West African migrants in other contexts 
(Newell 2012: 68-73, Whitehouse 2012: 84-90). 
9 A 2012 article in the news magazine Jeune Afrique profiles the activities of shoeshine boys in 
Conakry, most of whom are Pular speakers from the Fouta Djallon who come to the city to do 
menial (though entrepreneurial) work and live in humble conditions, with dreams of eventual 
grand success, modeling themselves on these same famously wealthy businessmen (Sow 2012).  
10 I frequently heard North American and European expatriates in Guinea complain that Fouta 
Djallon residents had fatalistic attitudes toward life and work, resigning themselves to God’s will 
in all matters. The significance of divine authority and the hope that the suffering of this world 
(aduna) will be followed by rewards in the afterlife are salient concepts in the Fouta Djallon; this 
is perhaps especially the case for women, whose agency is circumscribed in ways that men do 
not experience (Smid 2010). Nevertheless, the desire for an afterlife in paradise and the desire 
for success in this life are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
11 The military offers one of the main salaried job opportunities in Guinea, with a possibly 
inflated estimate of 45,000 soldiers in 2010 (International Crisis Group 2010). However, Fulɓe 
are significantly underrepresented in the military. 
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12 Some Fulɓe in the Fouta Djallon do practice agriculture, but many associate it with the lower 
status descendants of theocratic-era “captives,” as well as with the communal labor obligations 
of Sekou Touré’s socialist government. 
13 Mains (2007) describes a comparable dynamic among youth in Addis Ababa, where young 
men sit around in cafés and talk about having too much time on their hands, while young women 
spend their days doing housework and wish they could spend time drinking coffee with friends.  
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